[雙語翻譯]管理層收購?fù)馕姆g--通過對家族企業(yè)的管理層收購進(jìn)行價值創(chuàng)造的代理理論分析（英文）

1、An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firmsJames J. Chrisman a,b,*, Jess H. Chua c,g,1, Lloyd P. Steier d,2, Mike Wright e,f,3, D’Lisa N. McKee a,4a Mississippi State Univer

2、sity, MS 39762-9581, United States b Centre for Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada c Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Can

3、ada d University of Alberta School of Business, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6, Canada e Centre for Management Buyout Research, Imperial College, London SW7 2AZ, UK f University of Ghent, Belgium g Zhejiang University, China1

4、. IntroductionFamily firms account for the majority of firms around the world (La Porta, Lo ´pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Morck Chua, Chrisman, Lim, Lubatkin, Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Burrows, McConaughy, Matthe

5、ws, but bounded rationality makes it impossible for the contracting parties to execute complete contacts that anticipate and regulate every potential situation that may arise over the duration of the contract (Kaplan o

6、therwise, the principal could theoretically prevent or punish value appropriating behavior by the agent. Agency problems between owners and managers have received the most attention in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989),

7、but those arising between borrowers and lenders (Myers, 1977; Smith Villalonga using firm resources to pursue the managers’ personal agendas; or consumption of perks (e.g. JensenMilbourn, Shockley, SmithMorck et al.,

8、1988; MorckSchulze et al., 2003). Owner opportunism occursbecause despite its negative influence on firm value, the costs are shared by other owners while the benefits flow mainly to the controlling owners (Jensen Chua,

9、 Chrisman, Wright Child Chua et al., 1999). Likewise, we do not consider situations where a non-family CEO presides over a cadre of family managers or where the sole family ownerand family CEO are different people bec

10、ause these are usually temporaryarrangements designed to allow, respectively, time for family successors to obtainthe experience (Lee et al., 2003) or financial resources needed for the transition.Both are therefore much

11、 less likely to lead to an MBO than the configurations wedepict in Table 1. Finally, MBOs by family managers are also possible. However, theresulting firm would still be family owned and managed, although by a differentc

12、oalition of members of the same family. Since we are interested in MBOs thattransform family firms into non-family firms, we do not deal with situations thatinvolve intra-family MBOs.J.J. Chrisman et al. / Journal of Fam